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Europe and the Great Powers: Playing our Trump 
Cards  
Sven Biscop 
“We have no eternal allies, and we have no 
perpetual enemies. Our interests are 
eternal and perpetual, and those interests 
it is our duty to follow”. US President 
Donald Trump has done his very best to 
prove Lord Palmerston right. “America 
First”: in Trump’s story, allies appear 
mostly when he exhorts them to pay more. 
Europeans would be well advised to take 
Palmerston’s advice to heart themselves. 
Not only has Trump repeatedly declared 
NATO to be obsolete, he has also 
welcomed Brexit and has even expressed 
the hope that more countries would follow 
the British example and leave the EU. 
With an ally like that... So, let us not be 
overly constrained by our US ally and 
create new partnerships, notably in Asia.  
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concern.1 Fortunately, there is strong 
resistance against some of Trump’s policies, 
notably by the courts, and even in the 
Republican Party that he has usurped. The 
system may keep Trump in check. He might 
even come to see that maintaining a strong 
and united Europe is actually very much in the 
American interest.   
 
Perhaps – or perhaps not. It’s precisely the 
unpredictability of our main ally that is so 
disconcerting. That we Europeans do worry to 
the extent that we do is proof of our utter 
dependence on the US. This should give us 
pause to rethink our position, even if in the 
end Trump does not sell us out to Putin, does 
not break the nuclear deal with Iran, and does 
not launch a trade war against China. The fact 
is that we shouldn’t be in the position where 
we are so dependent on what a US President 
does or doesn’t do in the first place. We are, 
alas, not a strategic actor.  
 
When the transatlantic alliance works, it 
benefits Europe’s interests enormously. 
“Interests” is the key word here. It’s not just 
that the occupant of the White House has 
changed. His brazenness just alerts us to the 
fact that the world order has changed. The 
world has returned to a modern-day version of 
Palmerston’s (and Bismarck’s) balance of 
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Many Europeans still pretend that nothing has 
fundamentally changed. But a president who 
blames all ills on the outside world, who feels 
that America doesn’t need anybody and can 
just go it alone, who attacks the press as an 
enemy of the people, and who condemns 
anybody who disagrees with him as a “bad 
American”: these are the tell-tale signs of 
authoritarianism. It’s only because, unusually, 
this is happening in the US that we desperately 
try to find evidence to the contrary – even 
though voices in America too express this very 
concern. Fortunately, there is strong resistance 
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power politics, with its constantly shifting 
strategic friendships and enmities among the 
great powers. Now more than ever 
Palmerston’s dictum applies.  
 
We should not ask ourselves who we like or 
dislike the most – Donald Trump, Vladimir 
Putin or Xi Jinping. We should define our 
collective interests, through the EU, and assess 
with who of the other three great powers  we 
can partner to further which interests, flexibly 
and in full autonomy, even when the 
transatlantic alliance (pace Trump) remains a 
cornerstone of our strategy.  
 
A CHANCE WITH CHINA  
Trump’s protectionist stance has prompted 
many to suggest that China is now Europe’s 
main ally when it comes to upholding free 
trade. Even on climate change the Chinese 
position might be closer to ours than the 
American one. An export-dependent China is 
as worried as we are, if not more, about the 
threat of a trade war. Trump has dealt us a 
trump card therefore: an opportunity to forge 
a closer but at the same time more balanced 
relationship with China.  
 
EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia Malmström 
got it exactly right when she linked the fight 
against protectionism, on which the EU is 
ready to stand with China, with the ongoing 
negotiations on an EU-China investment 
treaty.2 For an equitable treaty to be possible, 
China needs to reform and open up to 
European investors, as Malmström pointed 
out.  
 
But should the EU not reform as well? If the 
Chinese market is too closed, ours is too open. 
By selling critical infrastructure to China and 
other foreign powers without any limits we 
enable them to subvert our decision-making 
and undermine our sovereignty. Will a 
newspaper in Russian hands still publish the 
news, or will it present “alternative facts”? Can 
 a seaport in Chinese hands still be used to 
channel military reinforcements to NATO’s 
eastern borders in a crisis situation, or would 
we have to circumvent it? Member States, 
notably Germany, have grown more concerned 
in the last year, but no Member State is going 
to limit foreign investment on its own, for fear 
of seeing all investment redirected towards its 
neighbours.  
 
The EU Hybrid Fusion Cell, which is to collect 
data and intelligence on “hybrid threats”, is of 
limited value here, for which government is 
going to report an increased vulnerability if it 
just invited the Chinese in itself? What is 
needed is a binding EU framework that sets 
limits on foreign ownership of critical 
infrastructure. Once such a regime is in place, a 
truly reciprocal EU-China investment treaty 
will be possible.  
 
That the EU and China can act together to 
maintain free trade does not preclude a frank 
dialogue about China’s more assertive policies. 
China must be made to understand that its 
attempt to pressure its neighbours into 
accepting its sphere of influence in the region 
of the South China Sea, for example, will 
always act as a brake on its relations with the 
EU. Our interest lies not so much in the 
substance of the resolution of the sovereignty 
claims – who owns which island is of little 
importance to the EU – as in their peaceful 
resolution without any impact on the freedom 
of the global commons.  
 
The alternative, China must also understand, is 
a military stand-off with the US, which under 
Trump is set to step up the military side of the 
pivot to Asia that Obama initiated. In his first 
phone call with Xi, Trump did confirm the US’ 
continued adherence to the “One-China-
Principle”, which he initially had seemed to 
doubt. Only because President Xi requested 
him to though, according to reports of the 
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conversation – that does not really show a lot 
of conviction. Furthermore, the US has also 
stated – presumably not at Xi’s request – that 
the disputed Fish Islands between China and 
Japan are covered by the US’ defensive alliance 
with Japan.   
 
Getting this message across will require more 
unity and clarity on the EU’s part then its 
measly “acknowledgement” of the outcome of 
the arbitration procedure between China and 
the Philippines in July 2016.3 The way to 
contain such power politics is “a rules-based 
global order with multilateralism as its key 
principle”, as the Global Strategy rightly states. 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the peaceful resolution of 
disputes are as much part of that order as free 
trade regimes and an investment treaty.  
 
Until now however, China prefers to address 
the maritime disputes with its neighbours in a 
purely bilateral context, where it can exert 
more power. If however China were to begin 
to behave as a responsible power, than for the 
EU it might not matter that in a certain part of 
the world China assumes responsibility for 
maintaining the freedom of the global 
commons instead of the US.  
 
The EU should of course not rush into 
anything, at the risk of merely switching its 
subservience from Washington to Beijing. I am 
not advocating a China-Europe Treaty of 
Alliance (which would be another kind of 
“CETA”) with what remains, after all, an 
authoritarian regime, which for the moment is 
becoming more repressive again, not less. 
Challenging though it may be, maintaining a 
critical stance on human rights is essential for 
the EU’s own legitimacy and soft power. But 
under the heading of “principled pragmatism”, 
as coined by its Global Strategy, the EU should 
not hesitate to pursue its interests and step up 
cooperation with China at the same time.  
 
AMBITIONS FOR ASIA  
Free trade, obviously, is not limited to China. 
The EU should develop an Asian free trade 
agenda that includes China as well as Japan, 
India, ASEAN and others, as also announced 
in the Global Strategy. Here is another 
potential trump card. At the same time as 
envisaging a military build-up, Trump has 
withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP), which would have been the economic 
foundation of his strategy. As a result, 
countries that were counting on TPP to allow 
them to keep a critical distance from China 
now risk being sucked even closer into China’s 
orbit. China will not hesitate to move into the 
vacuum that Trump has thus created.  
 
At a stroke, any future free trade agreements 
with the EU have gained real strategic 
importance, for there will be very few FTAs 
with western powers on offer. Because the EU 
can pursue an inclusive trade agenda, that 
encompasses rather than seeks to isolate China, 
and because it is not a military player in Asia, 
its strategy can be palatable for all parties as a 
workable alternative to ratcheting up military 
tensions.  
 
In this context, the EU could deepen its 
partnership with countries like Canada, which 
is looking to Asia as it southern neighbour 
threatens to undo the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Australia 
(whose Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, was 
brusquely rebuffed by Trump in their first 
phone call). Torn between its defence alliance 
with the US and its economic dependence on 
China, Australia has everything to gain from 
détente in Asia. So has Japan, but as yet Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe is pursuing the opposite 
strategy, moving even closer to the US.  
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The precondition for an EU strategy along these 
lines to work is, of course, that it has the ability 
to conclude FTAs in an effective and efficient 
manner in the first place. In the wake of the 
chaotic decision-making on the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (the real 
CETA) between the EU and Canada, we will 
have to convince our partners that trade deals 
can still be made with us, and our own publics 
that those trade deals are vital to their own 
continued prosperity. Which is not to say that 
the substance of those deals is completely 
beyond criticism.  
 
RESOURCEFUL ON RUSSIA  
Deepening relations with China could also be a 
way for the EU to increase the pressure on 
Russia somewhat. Just like ever since the 
Ukraine crisis Russia itself has been moving 
closer to China to signal to Europe that it has 
other options.  
 
China’s great foreign policy as well as foreign 
trade project today is the Belt and Road 
Initiative, a massive investment in infrastructure, 
including in a land route that links China to 
Europe by rail, via both Russia and Central Asia. 
For now, in spite of all the talk about 
“connectivity” and linking up the Belt and Road 
with the Juncker Commission’s own investment 
plan, that rail link mostly benefits China: trains 
arrive in Europe laden with Chinese goods, and 
return mostly empty. The Chinese calculus 
might also be that the more traffic can be shifted 
to the land route, the less concerned Europeans 
may feel about the South China Sea. 
 
Seen from the EU side, there is no need of 
developing this land route further, for there is a 
perfectly fine maritime route. Making sure that 
the maritime disputes in Asia do not threaten 
that is of much more importance to Europe 
than helping create a land route that could never 
really aspire to replace it.  
Still, the EU could continue to show its goodwill 
towards the Belt and Road, which may generate 
some Chinese goodwill in turn. Except that it 
cannot. Because the rail link is dependent on 
Russia, with whom the EU has become trapped 
in a geopolitical dispute over the fate of 
Zwischeneuropa, the countries wedged in between 
Brussels and Moscow. Why invest in a trade 
route that increases one’s dependence on an 
already assertive Russia? This, the EU should 
point out, is China’s problem, not just Europe’s, 
for the Belt and Road is a Chinese priority, not a 
European one.  
 
Many issues objectively would seem to 
constitute a source of geopolitical tension 
between China and Russia, such as the fact that 
Asian Russia is rather empty of Russians but 
quite full of natural resources, or the increasing 
presence, because of the Belt and Road, of 
China in Central Asia, which Russia also 
considers its chasse gardée. However, it is also very 
much in Beijing’s and Moscow’s interest to 
continue working together closely in view of 
what they perceive as a western-dominated 
global order.  
 
Europe should not hope to pry China and 
Russia apart, therefore, as Nixon and Kissinger 
did in the 1970s. But it can aim to make China 
realise that its usual stance of complete silence 
on Russia’s “adventurism”, which de facto 
amounts to supporting Russia, is not in its 
interest either. China has become an important 
economic partner for Ukraine, for example.  But 
the more turmoil there is in Russia’s “near 
abroad”, the fewer economic possibilities for the 
Belt and Road Initiative, which eyes exactly the 
same region. 
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CONCLUSION  
There is one major problem with this paper. 
Whatever happens in the world and whatever 
the other great powers undertake, one can 
always imagine a strategy to respond or even to 
anticipate, and thus safeguard Europe’s vital 
interests. It requires a rather bigger leap of the 
imagination to see the EU in its current state 
swiftly adopt and resolutely implement any such 
strategy. I wrote “the other great powers” on 
purpose: Europe, united in the EU, is a great 
power too – if only it would muster the will to 
act like one. Only then will the other great 
powers treat it seriously.  
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